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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-TRUSTS-PARTIAL ASSIGNmENTS-EFFECT OF DISCHARGE
UPON ASSIGNOR'S OBLIGATION TO PAY ASSIGNEE AFTER COLLECTION-Defend-
ant assigned to plaintiff a part of a debt due for wages earned; but the debtor-
employer was not notified. The assignor, having received his wages, failed to pay
the assignee, and on being sued pleaded a discharge in bankruptcy. Held, that
defendant was trustee of an express trust, and that his debt was not discharged
in bankruptcy. Hubbard v. Bibb Brokerage Co., i6o S. E. 639 (Ga. i93I).
In giving effect to its exclusive jurisdiction 1 over partial assignments, 2
equity has frequently spoken of the amount due the partial assignee as being
held in trust," a convenient but misleading phrase-, used not to indicate that an
express trust had been raised from the acts and intent of the parties, but merely
to denote that the law would imply a trust from the transaction.5 The provision
of the Bankruptcy Act, however, to the effect that a bankrupt shall not be dis-
charged from debts "created by his fraud, embezzlement., misappropriation, or
defalcation while acting as officer or in any fiduciary capacity" 0 has been almost
universally construed as applying not to constructive or implied trusts,7 but to
express trusts.8 This distinction, admitted by the court in the instant case, was
met by the declaration that the defendant was an express trustee. The essence
of a trust is a fiduciary relationship.9 To assume that a person, simply by making
an assignment, without more, intends to create such a relationship is somewhat
'Partial ass;gnments are not enforceable at law. "The reason of the principle is plain-
a creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of action into many actions with-
out the assent of the debtor, since it may subject him to many embarrassments and respon-
sibilities not contemplated in the original contract." Story, J., Mandeville v. Welch, 5
Wheat. 277, 286 (I82O).
2 Exchange Bank v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498 (1882); Chase Nat. Bank v. Sayles, II F.
(:zd) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926). See Note, ANN. CAs. 1912A 673.
The fact that the courts are merely using a convenient form of words is shown by
their indefiniteness as to who is trustee. Thus it has been held that if the obligor has been
given notice, he is trustee before collection, Bank of Harleih v. City of Bayonne, 48 N. J.
Eq. 246, 21 Atl. 478 (i89i) ; also, after collection by assignor, Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me.
i.q6. 9i Atl. 281 (1914) ; likewise, it has been held that the assignor is trustee after collection,
Hinlde Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N. Y. i79, x28 N. E. 113 (i92o).
S". . . It is most important to mark this again and again, for there is not a more
fruitful source of error in the law than the inaccuracy of language. The application to a
man, who is improperly and by metaphor only called a trustee, of all the consequences which
would follow if he were a trustee by express declaration,-in other words, a complete
trustee,--holding the property exclusively for the benefit of the cestui que trust, well illus-
trates the remark made by Lord Macclesfield, that nothing in law is so apt to mislead as
metaphor." Lord Westbury, Knox v, Gye, (1872) L. IL 5 H. L. 656, 676, quoted in 3
PoMERoY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) io44n.
'The distinction was early recognized in Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 3 Russ. & M. 457, 460
(831).
6 THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY AcT OF I898, C. 541 § 17, 30 STAT. 550 as amended by
the Act of 1903, C. 487, §5, 32 STAT. 798, 1I U. S. C. A. §35 (1927).T Hennequin v. Clews, iii U. S. 676, 4 Sup. Ct. 576 (1883) ; Bank of Enosburg Falls
v. Bamforth, go Vt 7., 96 Atl. 6oo (1916) ; Crawford v. Burke, i95 U. S. 176, 25 Sup. Ct.
9 (1904) ; Note (1912) 42 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1093.
'Bracken v. Milner, io4 Fed. 522 (W. D. Mo., igoo). In addition to express trustees,
the following are not discharged: executors, Brown v. Hannigan, 2io Mass. 24
6, 96 N. E.
714 (1914) ; administrators, Johnson's Adm'r v. Parmenter, 74 Vt. 58, 52 Atl. 73 (9o);
corporation officers, Harper v. Rankin, 41 Fed. 626 (C. C. A. 4 th, i9o5).
'A trustee, for instance, can enter into no transaction with the beneficiary concerning
the subject-matter without making a full disclosure of all the circumstances known to him
affecting the transaction. See TRusTs RESTATEmENT, Tentative Draft No. i (Am. L. Inst.
193o) § 2, and comment b. See also 2 PomEaoY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 958.
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surprising. Consequently, the better opinion is that the mere making of a partial
assignment does not give rise to an express trust.10  Whether or not a partial
assignor who is to collect and turn over the money, as was probably the situation
in the principal case,' is, after collection, such a "fiduciary" as not to be dis-
charged in bankruptcy, is another matter, 2 -although such a holding is incon-
sistent with the narrow construction usually accorded the statute.'8 Also in that
case, it is difficult to see why the assignor is any more than an agent for collection,
the debts of whom are almost universally conceded to be discharged in bank-
ruptcy.'1  The court's conclusion, then, seems undesirable, not only because its
labelling the assignment a trust is doubtful, but also because in so doing it makes
a questionable departure from a marked judicial tendency to effect discharges
in all but a few, obviously justifiable cases.
BANKS AND BANKING-BILLS AND NoTEs-AcTs CONSTITUTING PAY-
MENT BY DRAwEE BANK-Collecting bank, agent of plaintiff payee, mailed four
checks to defendant drawee for payment. Drawee entered the checks upon its
daily cash record as paid, and mailed collecting bank a statement crediting it for
the amount, as was their custom. The checks were not stamped "paid", nor
charged to the drawer's account. The same day, defendant's cashier, learning
of drawer's insolvency, withdrew the statement from the mail, cancelled collect-
ing bank's credit for the checks, removed the entries from the record of checks
paid, and had the four checks protested. Payee sued for the proceeds, alleging
payment of the checks. Defendant contended that they were protested within
twenty-four hours, and were not sol accepted as to enable the payee to sue thereon
under the Negotiable instruments Law.1  Held, that plaintiff could recover since
the defendant had paid the checks irrevocably. Guardian National Bank v.
Huntington County State Bank, 178 N. E. 574 (Ind. App. 1931).
Where the drawee of a check is authorized to use credit as a medium of
payment, the giving of such credit to the holder is a valid payment creating a
debtor-creditor relationship between the drawee and the holder.2 Although a
check be drawn upon insufficient funds, such a payment is, by the weight of
authority, irrevocable, 3 unless the parties intended it to be conditional upon the
" Todd v. Meding, 56 N. J. Eq. 83 (1897); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note
9, § 1g. See also, Dickinson, Gratuitous Partial Assignments (1921) 31 YALE L. J. I, lo.
According to Professor Williston, where the partial assignor is to collect and turn
over the money, there is no assignment at all, but merely a promise to pay. WILLsTON,
CONTRACTS (1924) § 441. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 156. This
gives rise to the question as to whether the assignee has an equitable lien on the fund
from which the assignor is to pay and on this the authorities are in conflict. See Trist v.
Child, 188 U. S. 441 (1874). WILUSTON, ibid. § 428. However, in the instant case it is
not clear that the assignee might not have collected, and the court ignored the distinction.
'It was so held in Mott Iron Works v. Toumey, 94 App. Div. 216, 87 N. Y. Supp.
1020 (1904).
"Supra note 7.
In re Camelo, ig. Fed. 92o (S. D. N. Y. 19o6). The rule holds even when an
agent is employed exclusively for collection. Noble v. Hammond, 129 U. S. 65, 9 Sup. Ct.
235 (1889). Although such cases have all the ear-marks of trusts, the debts are discharged
because of the judicial principle that the fiduciary relation must exist independently of the
transaction out of which the debt arises. Cronan v. Cotting, 2O4 Mass. 245 (187o). Thus
an attorney who has collected money for his client is not discharged in bankruptcy. Heffren
v. Jayne, 39 N. D. 463 (1872).
'IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 11495; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIMENTS LAW § 136.
ICohen v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Ariz. 3n4, 198 Pac. 122 (2921) ; Graham v. National
Bank, 32 Del. 264, i22 Atl. 85 (I923) ; Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735 (871);
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1926) 671.
'Riverside Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 74 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) ; Cohen v. First
Nat. Bank, supra note 2; American Exchange Bank v. Gregg, 138 Ill. 596, 28 N. E. 839
(1891) ; First Nat. Bank v. Burkham, 32 Mich. 328 (1875) ; Oddie v. National City Bank,
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reimbursement of the drawee by the drawer,4 or unless the holder knew that the
check was an overdraft and was paid in mistake.5 Where, as in the instant case,
the check is forwarded directly to the drawee for payment in credit, some courts
have held that a transfer of credit to the holder upon the drawee's books consti-
tutes a binding payment," while some require a transmission of evidence to the
holder that he has been so credited.? Still others hold that it is sufficient if any
acts of the drawee show a clear intention to make present payment.8  The court,
in the instant case, construed the mailing of the statement of credit by the drawee
to be conclusive evidence of completed payment,9 and there would seem to be
ample grounds for its conclusion that the drawee treated the checks as paid. The
chief value of the instant decision, however, is its proper recognition of the payee's
right to recover from the drawee, not upon the checks-since they had been paid-,
but as creditor for their proceeds.' 0 A surprising number of courts have failed
to make this distinction, and have applied to similar situations the provision of the
Negotiable Instruments Law that the holder of a bill of exchange cannot sue
,supra note 2; BRADY, BANK CHECKS (2d ed. 1926) § 204; 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING
(5th ed. 1917) § 449.
"Hentz v. National City Bank, 159 App. Div. 743, 144 N. Y. Supp. 979 (1913) ; Farmers
Guar. State Bank v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 S. W. 400 (Tex. Civ. App. i918);
BRANNAN, op. cit. mipra note z at 836. But cf. Security Nat. Bank v. Old Nat. Bank, 241
Fed. I (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Hay v. First Nat. Bank, 244 Ill. App. 286 (927). Some
courts hold that, unless a contrary intention is expressed, payment is conditional upon the
drawer's reimbursement of the drawee. Boyd v. Emerson, 2 Ad. & E. 184 (Eng. 1834) ;
Ocean Park Bank v. Rogers, 6 Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879 (1907) ; Merchants Nat. Bank
v. National Bank, 139 Mass. 513, 2 N. E. 89 (1885); see (1918) IS COL L. REv. 480.
'Iowa State Bank v. Cereal Refund & Brokerage Co., 132 Iowa 248, iog N. W. 719
(i96).
'Consolidated Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 129 App. Div. 538, 114 N. Y. Supp. 308
(i9o8); City Nat. Bank v. Burns, 68 Ala. 267 (1879); American Exchange Bank v.
Gregg, supra note 3.
'Steinhart v. National Bank, 94 Cal. 362, 29 Pac. 717 (1892). But notice to the
holder that credit has been given is effective upon mailing, and cannot be withdrawn sub-
sequently. Cohen v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 2; Canterbury v. Bank of Sparta, 91 Wis.
53, 64 N. W. 311 (1895). The instant case so held at 58o. Contra: Steinhart v. National
Bank, supra; cf. Traders Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 14z Tenn. 229, 217 S. W. 977
(i92o). Where no credit has been transferred to the holder upon the drawee's books, a
statement of credit mailed in error can be withdrawn. Walnut Hill Bank v. National Res.
Bank, 141 App. Div. 475, 126 N. Y. Supp. 430 (igio); cf. Carley v. Potter's Bank, 46
S. W. 328 (Tenn. Ch. 1897).
'Oddie v. National City Bank, supra note 2; National Bank v. Burkhardt, oo U." S.
686 (1879); Oregon Iron & Steel Co. v. Kelso State Bank, 129 Wash. 109, 224 Pac. 569
(I924).
'At 580. Under the postal regulations a letter may be withdrawn from the mails
within twenty-four hours after posting, but the court, after a confused analogy to the
construdtive acceptance of an offer, held that these regulations did not alter the conclusion
that the drawee's statement of credit created a binding obligation upon mailing. It seems
clear that the anomalous "mailing doctrine" should be restricted to situations involving
offer and acceptance. An interesting application of the doctrine to the law of bills and
notes is found, however, in § io5 of the NEGOTIABLE INsTRUmENTs LAW, which provides
that: "Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and deposited in the post-office, the sender
is deemed to have given due notice, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the mails." It
seems obvious that 'the better analogy in the instant case would be an analogy to the delivery
of a deed or written instrument which becomes operative so soon as the maker puts it out
of his control with intent that it shall be at once effective.' See Cohen v. First Nat. Bank,
smpra note . The court in the instant case dismissed the problem by declaring, at 580, "In
all events the depositing of the cash letter in the mail . . . was an admission that the checks
had been paid."
"Thus making it unnecessary to decide whether there had been an acceptance by the
drawee under NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, §§ 126, 127, 132 and 136, upon which
the defendant relied. Accord: Cohen v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 2; Lone Star Trucking
Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 24o S. W. iooo (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; Westberg v. Chicago Lum-
ber & Coal Co., 117 Wis. 589, 94 N. W. 572 (1903); BRANNAN, op. cit supra note 2 at 836 ;
I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) §454; (927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 67o.
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the drawer thereon wheie the latter has not accepted the bill.1' It is interesting
to note that the plaintiff would probably have been denied recovery under a Bank
Collections Code adopted after the occurrence of this transaction.' 2 This statute
has been adopted in eighteen states, including Pennsylvania,"8 and provides that
credit given in payment of a check may be revoked by the bank within the same
day,14 and that where a check is presented by mail to the drawee for payment it
"shall be deemed paid when the amount is finally charged to the account of the
maker or drawer." 15 While there is unquestionably a need for uniformity in
determining what acts constitute payment in the "direct routing" cases, it would
seem that the mere failure of the drawee to debit the drawer's account should not
be made the sole determining factor where there is other evidence of payment.'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COM MERCE COMMISSION-EFFECT OF
"LEGISLATIVE" POWER TO Fix RATES ON "JUDICIAL" POWER TO AWARD REPARA-
TION-In 192I on complaint of shippers, the Commission found an existing rail-
road rate unreasonable and prescribed for the future a maximum rate of 96.5
cents. On further complaint in 1925 it reduced the maximum to 71 cents and
determined that reparation was due for intervening shipments, but no award was
made until the reopening of the case in 1927.' Held (Holmes and Brandeis dis-
NEGOIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 127. Clarke v. National City Bank, 78 Mont. 48,
252 Pac. 37.3 (1926) ; State Bank v. Weiss, 46 Misc. 93, 91 N. Y. Supp. 276 (1904) ; Wisner
v. First Nat. Bank, 22o Pa. 21, 68 AtI. 9.55 (i9o8) ; Traders Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank,
142 Tenn. 229, 217 S. W. 977 (1919) ; Rodgers v. Farmers State Bank, 264 S. W. 491
(Tex. Civ. App., 1924).
Ind. Laws 1929, c. 164.
Pa. Laws 19.31, Act 198. For a list of the states which have adopted this Code,
drafted by the American Bankers' Association, see Beutel, The N. I. L. Should Not Be
Amended (1932) 8o U. oF PA. L. REv. 368, 381 n. 68. To this list New York should be
added (N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 589). See also Note (I929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 3o7.
" § 3. As drafted, the section makes no distinction between checks presented for pay-
ment over the counter and checks sent direct to the drawee by mail. Since the credit in
the instant case was cancelled within twenty-four hours, this section would probably bar the
plaintiff's recovery as a creditor of the bank.
i§ 7. There has, as yet, been no decision interpreting this section. If it be interpreted
to mean that until the drawer's account has been charged for the check there can be no
payment, it materially alters the common law. See Turner, Bank Collections (1930) 39
YALE L. J. 468. If, however, this negative inference is not to be drawn from the wording
of the section, and payment could be made although the drawer's account were not charged,
it does little or nothing to aid the courts in determining whether or not payment has been
made. It is also doubtful whether § 3 would apply after the drawer's account has *been
finally charged. Section 7 is expressly applicable only to checks presented for payment by
mail, and obviously would not apply to credits given in payment of a check presented over
the counter.
"In situations in which the bank had failed to debit the drawer's account, but had re-
tained possession of the check without refusing payment for more than twenty-four hour%
while the Code miqht bar the presumption of payment by § 7, the holder might still re-
cover on the grounds that the drawee's delay in refusing payment had prevented him from
giving notice of dishonor to the drawee, thereby releasing the latter under NFGmroABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAw §§ 89, 103 and 1O4. Some courts would doubtless find that such a reten-
tion would operate as an acceptance under § 137, ibid., but the application of that section is
extremely questionable where the check is presented for payment, and not for acceptance.
BRANNAN, loc. cit. supra note io. It is even possible that the holder might be permitted
to recover upon the theory that the bank, by its negligent retention of the check, would be
estopoed to deny payment. In the instant case the check was protested within twenty-four
hours, and the holder could not, apparently, have availed himself of any of these remedies,
under the Code.
'The history of the present case in the hands of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
is contained in 62 I. C. C. 412 (1921) ; 95 I. C. C. 244 (1925) ; 140 I. C. C. 171 (1928).
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senting 2), that in prescribing a maximum rate for future operation the Commis-
sion exercises a delegated legislative power and therefore cannot in effect retro-
actively repeal the prior enactment by ignoring it in its quasi-judicial capacity.
Arizuna Grocery Co. v. Atchison, 7'. & S. F. Ry. Co., 52 Sup. Ct. 183 (1931).
The present decision is an important constitutional curtailment of the Com-
mission's administrative powers. Hitherto, the Commission had repudiated the
idea that the judicial principles of res adjudicata and stare decisis were applicable 3
to its rate determinations for the reason, among others, that economic conditions
in continuous flux necessitate a flexible means of making frequent adjustments.
4
Now, if it exercises its recently acquired power 5 to act prospectively, it must
command with finality and not provisionally with a view to alteration if a more
complete investigation makes this necessary in the interest of shippers." The
result here reached by the Supreme Court was foreshadowed by utterances in
prior cases. 7  Frequent has been the assertion that rate regulation is a fundamen-
tally legislative function despite the quasi-judicial character of the tribunal
exercising it and regardless of the judicial character of the proceedings antecedent
to the final regulatory decree.8 It is recognized that the Commission now has
dual powers,9 legislative and judicial, and that these powers may be employed in
a single proceeding.' 0 It is assumed, although not decided, that in the exercise of
the latter power, the- Commission need not adhere to the principle of judicial
estoppel. But the two powers are distinct. Just as a court could not ignore an
enactment of Congress, so the Commission in its judicial capacity must respect its
legislative pronouncement. This may prove a heavy burden to the Commission
which will want to act fairly with the public; or it may discourage its use of the
2 The dissenting justices approved the reasoning of Judge Hutcheson's concurring opin-
ion in Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 51 F. (2d) 443 (1931).
'See Board of R. R. Commissioners v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 8 I. C. C. 304,
308 (i89g) ; Cattle Raisers' Ass'n v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 12 I. C. C. 507, 514 (Io7). The
Commission, however, frankly admits that uniformity is desirable, Kansas -City Hay Deal-
ers' Ass'n v. M. P. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. j97, 6oo (I9o8) ; (i927) .6 NEB. L. BuLL. 177.
'2 SHARFmAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMIssION (1931) § 3.
'Section 1.5 of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 STAT. 378, 384, 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 14 (i926), had been construed to prohibit prospective regulation, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. i97, i6 Sup. Ct. 666 (I896) ; see Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 493, 17 Sup.
Ct. 896, 898 (I8g7) ; Baer Bros. v, Denver & R. G. R. R. Co., 233 U. S. 479, 486, 34
Sup. Ct. 641, 644 (1913). This was amended by the Hepburn Act of igo6, 34 STAT. 589,
49 U. S. C. A. §. I4, is (1926) which conferred the power to fix maximum rates, and by
the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § I5 (I) (1926), which
conferred the power also to fix minimum and particular rates.
'See Toledo Produce Exchange v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 31 I. C. C. 830, 835
(1892) ; Traffic Bureau of Nashville v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 43 I. C. C. 366, 369 (917).
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. N. 0. & T. R. Ry. Co.; Baer Bros. v. Den-
ver & R. G. R. R. Co., both supra note .5; see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 2io,
226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 69 (igog) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 305, 34
Sup. Ct. 48, 5i (1913); Contra: People v. Willcox, i94 N. Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (1909);
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458, 10 Sup. Ct. 462, 467 -(189o) ;
and see DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LA.W (1927)
15-25; FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND Pi ogErY (1928) § 9; ABBoT,
JUSTICE AND THE MODERN LAW (1913) 110-112.
' "The nature of the final act determines the nature of the previous inquiry" per Holmes
in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, supra note , at 228, 29 Sup. Ct. at 5i.
'Cf. Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797 (1922) ; T. &
P. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Louisiana, 137 La. io59, 69 So. 837 (I915) ; Young Heading
Co. v. Payne, i27 Miss. 48, 89 So. 782 (i2I) ; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of
Texas, 3 S. W. (2d) 489 (Tex. Civ. APP. 1928); and see Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. So. Ry.
Co., supra note 2, which compare the powers of the state public service commissions with
those of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
" See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, supra note 7, at 225, 29 Sup. Ct. at 50; HALL,
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1926) 290.
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legislative power. At any rate the present case is an unequivocal admission that
the railroads are entitled to some consideration, and that whatever is beneficial to
their patrons will not, for that reason alone, be considered their duty.
CONTRACTS-LOTTERIES-PERFORMANCE OF CONDITION AS CONSIDERATION
-NATURE OF CONSIDERATION IN LoTTERY-Defendant advertised that everyone
who attended his auction sale, regardless of bidding or buying, would be given a
chance on aftautomobile to be awarded to the holder of the lucky number. In
response to this offer, the plaintiff attended and was subsequently adjudged the
winner, but defendant refused to deliver the car or its value. Held, that the
plaintiff could not compel delivery since the transaction was a lottery. Maughs v.
Porter, 161 S. E. 242 (Va. 1931).
Although the plaintiff fulfilled the condition on which the defendant's
promise was based, .she cannot recover unless performance of the condition was
the price of the promise.' Since she was not legally obligated to attend the sale,
her doing so, at the request of the promisor, was capable of being a legal con-
sideration.2 In addition, the promisor was benefited by an augmented audience
at his sale. Therefore, the correct inference is that compliance with the condition
was requested as consideration for the promise rather than with the intent of
making a gift upon its occurrence.3 The plaintiff escaped preclusion from recov-
ery because of lack of consideration only to be transferred to the other horn of
the dilemma. By showing consideration, the court held that she established a
lottery and therefore could not recover on an illegal contract.4 But it does not
follow that a consideration sufficient to support a contract is necessarily the kind
cf consideration contemplated by the statute prohibiting lotteries. 5 As the
11 WLLsTxN, CoNTRAcTS (x924 ed.) § 112. CONTRACrS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
1928) § 75 () : "Consideration for a promise is an act . . . bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise." Cf. opinion of Brett, C. J., in Great Northern Ry. v. Witham,
L. R. 9 C. P. I6, ig (1873) with Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
* "Any detriment suffered, or any legal right given up or forborne by the promisee, is
a sufficient consideration for an agreement." Stone v. Demarest, 95 Misc. 543, 545, 159
N. Y. Supp. 8oo, 8oi (1916). Accord: Spencer v. Bynum, 169 N. C. ii9, 85 S. E. 216 (1915);
Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (I89i).
In People v. Mail & Express Co., 179 N. Y. Supp. 640 (1919), aff'd, 182 N. Y. Supp.
943 (I92O), where a newspaper gratuitously distributed numbered slips, a prize to be given
to the holder of the lucky number, the court considered that such a holder performed the
condition on which the offer was based, but did not furnish consideration for the promise.
8 Wn.usToN, op. cit. supra note I, at 2.33. See Union Bank v. Sullivan, 214 N. Y. 332,
339, io8 N. E. 558, _56o (i9is) ; Corbin, in SELEcTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs
(1931) 509-511.
' It is generally recognized that one cannot employ an illegal transaction to establish
his case. Rountree v. Ingle, 94 S. C. 231, 77 S. E. 931 (1913). See (1931) 80 U. oF PA.
L. REv. _-W.
'The elements of a lottery are consideration, prize and chance. See Bronaugh, Gam-
bling in Business (z923) Z' LAW Noms 47; Campbell, Advertising Schemes and the Lot-
tery Law (1916) 2 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 178. In the instant case, the elements of prize
and chance are unquestionably present. Where no monetary consideration is received, there
is, of course, nothing to prevent a person from disposing of his property by chance. See
Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 199, 7 So. 338 (1889).
There are other examples where the same thing may be good consideration for one
purpose but not for another. Ordinarily, a dollar is a sufficient consideration, Southern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Harris, 117 Ga. ioo1, 44 S. E. 885 (19o3), but it will not support a promise
to pay a much larger sum. Shephard v. Rhodes, 7 R. I. 470 (1863). On the other hand,
a moral obligation will not usually constitute consideration, Freeman v. Dodge, 98 Me.
531, .57 Atl. 884 (1904), yet it is a good consideration for a bankrupt's promise to pay a
discharged debt. Lambert v. Schmalz, 118 Cal. 33, 5o Pac. 13 (I897).
So, too, ". . . while 'love and affection' is generally held to be a sufficient consideration
to support a conveyance, at least as between the parties, it may not be a sufficient consid-
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Virginia statute 6 does not define a lottery, the court should have construed it
in accordance with the general understanding of the term.7  Bishop's definition,8
"any scheme whereby one om pay~ment of money or other vualuable thing 9 .
becomes entitled to receive . . . such a return . . . as some formula of chance
may determine", has been approved by many courts.' 0 Where chances are given
with purchases, even though at no increased cost, it is usually considered a lottery
on the ground that the price furnishes the consideration for both." But where
the chances are offered to purchasers and non-purchasers alike, obviously no
valuable consideration is received in exchange." A recovery might properly
have been permitted in the instant case. It would not have been enforcing a
gratuity inasmuch as the plaintiff furnished consideration, yet that consideration
was not of the pecuniary nature" or economic value 1 which is ordinarily
required to constitute a lottery.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-EFFECT OF STATUTE APPLYING TO SOME
MEMBERS OF A CoNSPIRAcY-The defendant was indicted for conspiring with
A, B and other persons unknown, to intimidate workmen. By statute,' it was
lawful for workmen on strike to combine in furtherance of the strike. A and
B were workmen on strike. The defendant was not a workman on strike, and
was tried separately and convicted. Hdd, that the conviction be affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 157 Ati. 221 (Pa. 1931).
The court gave two separate reasons for affirming the conviction of the lower
court. The first was that the proof showed that the defendant had combined
with the unknown persons mentioned in the indictment. It is generally held that
such proof is sufficient.2  The second reason was that the proof showed that the
defendant combined with A and B, the workmen on strike. This second reason
raises a point of unusual interest. Can a person accused of conspiracy be con-
victed when the persons with whom he is accused of conspiring are not subject
eration to support a promise." Exum v. Lynch, I88 N. C. 392, 396, 125 S. E. I5, 18 (1924).
Likewise what may be adequate consideration in law may not be deemed consideration in
equity and vice versa.
'VA. CODE ANN. (1924) §4693.
'See United States v. Olney, I Abb. 275, 278 (D. Ore. I868).
'STATUTORY CRIMES (3d ed. Igoi) § 952.
'Italics supplied.
" State v. Lasselle, i.4 La. 168, 17o, 97 So. 389, 390 (923) ; Commonwealth v. Banks,
98 Pa. Super. 432, 436 (193o).
' Standridge v. Williford-Burns-Rice Co., 148 Ga. 283, 96 S. E. 498 (i916); State v.
Powell, i7o Minn. 239, 212 N. W. 169 (1927) ; Blair v. Lowham, 73 Utah 599, 276 Pac. 292
(1929) ; Society Theatre v. Seattle, ii8 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21 (1922). Contra: Williams
Furniture Co. v. McComb, 147 Miss. 640, 112 So. 579 (1927).
'Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893) ; People v. Mail & Express Co.,
supra note .5; see Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n, io S. W. (2d) 124
(Tex. 1928). Contra: Glover v. Molloska, 238 Mich. =16, 213 N. W. 1O7 (1927); State
v. Danz, 140 Wash. .46, 250 Pac. 37 (1926) (four justices dissenting).
"That the consideration must be of a pecuniary nature has been emphasized by many
courts. Hull v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 (1874); State v. Mercantile Ass'n, 45 Kan. 351,
2.5 Pac. 984 (1891). In the instant case, at 244, the court recognizes that "it seems to be
perfectly well settled that, where there is a payment of money for a chance to draw a prize
by lot, this is a lottery." (Italics supplied.) Apparently, it neglected to give the phrase which
is italicised any significance.
"Actual labor expended in return for the opportunity to win a prize to be awarded by
chance has been held a sufficiently valuable consideration to constitute the transaction a lot-
tery. Loveland v. Bode, 214 Ill. App. 399 (i919).
'PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 21254; Act of June 16, 1891, P. L 300.
'People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91, 87 N. E. 885 (19o9) ; Comm. v. Edwards, 135 Pa. 474,
i Ati. 1O64 (189o).
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to conviction? There are numerous statements in the cases to the effect that
the guilt of at least two conspirators must be shown before any of the conspirators
can be convicted,3 but these are merely dicta. An analysis of the cases however,
furnishes the principle that a conviction for conspiracy will not be sustained
unless there exists, or once existed, the possibility of the conviction of at least
one other besides the accused. Thus, a conspirator may be tried alone and con-
victed,' and the death before conviction of one of two conspirators is no bar to
the conviction of the other;r but the acquittal of all but one of the persons
accused of conspiring will prevent the conviction of the remaining one.6 It is
difficult to distinguish the situation in which all but one have been acquitted from
that in which all but one would assuredly be acquitted if brought to trial.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-IDENTITY OF OFFENSEs-CoNvICTIONS FOR MIS-
DEMEANOR AND FELONY ARISING OUT OF SAME TRANSACTION-Defendant, who
had been convicted of the misdemeanor of assault and battery in a court having
juiisdiction over misdemeanors only, was subsequently indicted for the felony of
rape arising out of the same transaction. Held, that the prior conviction was no
bar to the indictment. Commonwealth v. McCan, 178 N. E. 633 (Mass. 193).
The well-established common law principle that no man shall be twice tried
for the same offense ' has been incorporated into the United States Constitution 2
and into the constitutions of most of our states.3 While at common law the
principle could be invoked only by showing a prior acquittal or conviction,4 under
the double jeopardy prohibitions contained in the various constitutions, the re-
quirement has been relaxed to the extent that the plea of double jeopardy will be
sustained on proof merely that the prisoner, while not convicted of the same
offense before, had been in jeopardy of conviction. 5 However, whether the
requirement as to jeopardy be former conviction or merely danger of being con-
victed, the plea cannot be sustained unless the former jeopardy was as to the same
offense.6 Obviously rape and assault and battery are not the same offense. How-
ever an assault and battery is an element of and is included in the crime of rape.
7
'People v. Mader, 313 Ill. 277, 285, 145 N. E. 137, 140 (1924); Comm. v. Valverdi,
32 Pa. Super. 241, 246 (I9O6) ; Comm. v. Sanderson, 4o Pa. Super. 416, 484 (igog). The
court evidently had these dicta in mind when it attempted to support the conviction on the
second ground, declaring that there were at least two persons guilty of conspiring, and that
the statute merely exempted the striking workmen from criminal punishment for conspiracy
without affecting their guilt. In view of the wording of the statute, this argument seems
of little weight. The statute reads: ". .. it shall be lawful for employees . . . to devise
and adopt ways and means to make such rules . . . or regulations effective .... "
"People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412, 7 Pac. 828 (i885) ; Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa.
145 (1879) ; Rex v. Kinnersley, I Str. 593 (Eng. 1719).
'Commonwealth v. Bonnem, 95 Pa. Super. 496 (ig28).
6 Sherman v. State, 113 Neb. 173, 2o2 N. W. 413 (i925); State v. Tom, i3 N. C. 569
(I83O); Evans v. People, 90 I1. 384 (1878).
' Ex parte Lange, i8 Wall. 163, i68 (U. S. 1873) ; 4 BL. Comm~s. *335, *336.
-. "... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U. S. CoNsT., Amend. V.
I The state constitutions contain similar provisions, some omitting the words "of life
or limb". The constitutions of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts and North
Carolina omit entirely the provision, while the Iowa constitution of 1857, art. I, § 12 reads,
"No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." A like provision is found
in the constitutions of New Hampshire and New Jersey.
&'Ex parte Lange, supra note 1; 4 BL Comm., supra note I.
'Thus it is held that the accused is in jeopardy from the time the jury is impaneled,
sworn, and charged with the accused. Ex parte Harron, 191 Cal. 457, 217 Pac. 728 (923);
Peavey v. State, 153 Ga. ii9, iii S. E. 42o (i92).
OCommonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496, 502 (Mass. 1832); Commonwealth v. Weston,
241 Mass. 131, 135 N. E. 465 (922).
7People v. Purcell, 16 N. Y. Supp. igg (891).
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Most courts agree that a conviction or acquittal of an offense which is an essential
element of and is included in a larger crime will bar a subsequent conviction of
the larger offense." These courts have felt that to allow the state to divide the
larger crime into its included crimes would be to foster an unfair practice.' In
support of their holding some courts have evolved artificial rules for determining
what is the same offense,10 while others have pointed out that in this situation
there is a true case of double jeopardy since on the second indictment for the
larger crime the prisoner is again in danger of being convicted of the included
offense." The court in the principal case attempts to dismiss this objection by
saying that to the second indictment the defendant may plead his former convic-
tion as to the assault and battery included therein and not guilty as to the rest of the
crime charged.' 2 It is submitted that this argument cannot stand because there
cannot properly be a conviction for the rape charged without proof of an essential
element of the crime, an assault and battery.
EQUITY-RESCISSION OF GIFT INDUCED BY INNOCENT MISREPRESENTA-
TIONS OF A THIRD PARTY-Executor's wife, by mistake, misrepresented the size
of decedent's estate to the petitioner, thereby inducing him to assign his interest
therein to his co-heir. The misstatements were made without the knowledge or
authority of the co-heir. Subsequently, hitherto unknown assets of the decedent
were discovered, but notice of the discovery was withheld from the petitioner,
who now sues to rescind the assignment. Held, that the petitioner may rescind
the gift. In re Clark's Estate, 253 N. Y. Supp. 524 (193i).
Although, in an action of deceit at law, it is ordinarily a condition precedent
to the plaintiff's right to recover damages that the defendant knowingly 1 made
'People v. Purcell, supra note 7; State v. Smith, 43 Vt. 324 (I87i) ; Reg. v. Erlington,
9 Cox Crim. Cas. 86 (186i). There are two well established exceptions to this rule. Where
an offender fraudulently institutes a prosecution against himself in a justice's court for the
purpose of preventing an indictment against him, which purpose may well be implied from
the circumstances, he cannot set up his conviction to defeat an indictment subsequently
presented. DeHaven v. State, 2 Ind. App. 376, 28 N. E. 562 (1891) ; People v. Cuatt, 70
Misc. Rep. 453, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1114 (I91). And where, at the time of the first con-
viction, a conviction for the second offense was impossible because the second crime charged
was not completed, the first conviction will not bar a conviction for the larger offense.
Commonwealth v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204, 68 Atl. 184 (907) (indictment for murder and
conviction thereon upheld where the victim had died subsequent to the conviction of the
defendant, his assailant, for assault with intent to kill). This exception is justified on the
ground that "the new element of the injured person's death is not merely a supervening
aggravation; it creates a new crime". 5 Irv. 310, 314 (Scotland, 1866).
'People v. Purcell, supra note 7; I BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 1057;
Gladden v. State, 132 So. 435 (Ala. 1931).
"Some courts state that the offense is the same where the evidence necessary to sus-
tain a conviction on the second indictment is such as would have supported a conviction
on the first indictment. State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282, 285 (1879). Others have evolved the
even more liberal rule that the plea will be sustained if both offenses arose out of the same
transaction. Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853) ; Worley v. State, 42 Okla. Cr. App. 4o,
275 P c. 399 (1929).
'People v. Purcell, supra note 7; 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 9.
' Commonwealth v. McCan, 178 N. E. 633, 635 (Mass. 1931). The court further
attempts to justify its decision on the ground that the court which convicted for the mis-
demeanor had no jurisdiction to convict for the felony, and that for that reason the de-
fendant was not twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The lack of jurisdiction
of the court to convict for a felony, however, did not prevent the defendant from again
being in jeopardy of conviction for the misdemeanor on the indictment for the felony.
'Or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51
(1789) ; Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Adol. 114 (18.32) ; Peek v. Derry, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
In Massachusetts, scienter is not necessary. Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass.
4o3, i8 N. E. 168 (1888).
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false statements, it is not necessary, in an action in equity to rescind a transaction
consummated through misrepresentations of material facts by the other party,
to prove that such misrepresentations were intentional. 2  There seems to be little
difference in the decisions whether the misrepresentations leading up to the trans-
action were made by the other party thereto or by a third person,
s regardless of
whether such third person was the agent of the other party or not.
4 The court
in the instant case refused to rest its decision upon any principle of agency,
5
thereby recognizing that. the issue transcends any such formalistic doctrines, and
resolves itself into the equitable necessity of restoring the status quo to a party
who, through no fault of his own, has been persuaded to enter upon a given course
of conduct, to his detriment. These considerations should apply with even
greater force where the transaction is one of gift, since the donee obtains a pure
gratuity, and it seems unconscionable to allow him to reap the benefit of a bounty
which was induced by the misrepresentations of a third party.7  The situation]
is in no wise altered by the fact that they were innocently made: although no
decisions squarely on point were found, it would seem, by a parity of reasoning
with cases in which the state of mind of the other party was held to be of no
moment, that it is precisely as imperative to restore the status quo in the one case
as in the other. The decision in the instant case works perfect equity, by com-
pelling the donee to disgorge that to which he has no moral claim, and by restor-
ing to the donor that which he never intended to deliver.
2Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N. Y. 375, 380, 118 N. E. 855, 856 (1918); 2 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 885. In Massachusetts, fraud is predicated in equity
even of innocent misrepresentations upon which another relies. Bates v. Cashman, 23o
Mass. 167, 119 N. E. 663 (1918).
As an interesting matter of pleading, courts of equity have gone so far as to hold that
even though the person seeking to rescind has alleged fraud in his bill, and is unable to
prove the scienter, there is no fatal variance, and the relief sought will nevertheless be
granted upon proof of any misrepresentation of material facts, no matter how innocently
made. Bloomquist v. Farson, supra; Ryon v. Wanamaker, 116 Misc. 91, 1go N. Y. Supp.
250 (I92I), aff'd, 194 N. Y. Supp. 977 (922).
Of course, even a stronger case for rescission is presented where the other party dis-
covers the truth of the situation and permits the one misled to continue in error. Pom~ERoy,
cp. cit. supra, § 888.
'"The fact that the principles stated . . . were applied to conveyances inter sese does
not render them inapplicable in this instance, where the whole consideration was paid by
the parent [complainant] and the deed was executed by the vendor to the child [defendant]."
Ellis v. Drake, 2o6 Ala. 145, 146, 89 So. 388, 389 (921). Accord: Huguenin v. Baseley,
14 Ves. (Eng. 18o7) 273; Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 537 (N. Y. 1824) (contract set aside
against a party who had no personal knowledge of the fraud) ; Bergen v. Udall, 31 Barb.
9 (N. Y. 1858) (deed to an innocent purchaser set aside). Contra: See v. See, 237 S. W.
795 (Mo. 1922).
' "It is not a question of agency, but a question of fraud. If the instrument in question
was obtained from the plaintiff by misrepresentation and fraud it cannot be held against
her. It is quite immaterial who perpetrated the fraud, the defendant cannot enjoy its re-
sults and retain its benefits by a claim that it was unauthorized by him." Bedell v. Bedell,
37 Hun 419, 421 (N. Y. 1885). The court expressly repudiated the agency aspect in Pitn-
pinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N. Y. 159, 17o N. E. 530 (1930).
'At 528.
"This proposition has behind it the weighty authority of Lord Eldon, in Huguenin v.
Baseley, supra note 4, at 288: "I should regret that any doubt could be entertained, whether
it is not competent to a Court of Equity to take away from third persons the benefits, which
they have derived from the fraud, imposition, or undue influence, of others. . . . If a per-
son could get out of the reach of the doctrine and principle of this Court by giving interests
to third persons, instead of reserving them to himself, it would be almost impossible ever
to reach a case of fraud."
7 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft No. 9 (Am. L. Inst. 1931) §94 A, Com-
ment: "A donee cannot conscientiously retain an advantage obtained from another because
of a third person's misconduct, even if the donee neither knew nor had reason to know
of it."
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HUSBAND AND WIFE-DOWER-RIGHT TO SHARE IN PROCEEDS OF LAND
TAKEN BY EMINENT DOMAIN-A municipal corporation in the exercise of its
right of eminent domain condemned land belonging to the defendant. Defend-
ant's wife brought a bill in equity to have a portion of the proceeds set aside for
her in lieu of her dower 1 expectancy in the property. Held, that the wife was
not entitled to any part of the proceeds. Briegel v. Briegel, Pa. Sup. Ct. decided
Nov. 23, 1931.
The decision in the principal case is an illustration of the fact that Pennsyl-
vania does not favor dower as strongly as do other states.2 That dower is gener-
ally favored by the law - is shown by the protection accorded it even when it is
a mere inchoate right during the husband's lifetime.4 It is generally said to be a
property right ' which cannot be taken away from the wife without her consent.6
Thus a conveyance of land by the husband alone does not affect this right,7 so
that it is a breach of a covenant to convey free of encumbrances.8 Even an ante-
nuptial conveyance by the husband to defeat this right of dower will be set aside.9
Where land is taken under a right of eminent domain, however, the right of
'There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as dower in Pennsylvania. In re Heckman's
Estate, 299 Pa. 369, 149 Atd. 646 (193o). The Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, PA. STAT.
(West, i92o) § 8352 provides that in lieu of dower the surviving wife gets a stated
portion (depending on issue surviving) of the real estate of which the husband died seised or
which he aliened during coverture without her joining in the conveyance, which by the Act
of June 7 1917, P. L. 403, § 23 (a), PA. STAT. (West, I920) § 8335 can even be taken
against the will. The court might have held that since this land was neither land of which
the husband would die seised nor which he had aliened, according to the usual meaning of
the word, that the wife had no interest in the land in question. Kephart, J., expressly dis-
misses this solution, however, at page 3 of the manuscript opinion, saying, "we refer to stat-
utory dower, though the rule governing the question involved would apply alike to common
law or statutory dower."
2Thus Pennsylvania, contrary to the great weight of authority, has also decided that
land is personalty for the payment of debts and is therefore sold to satisfy a judgment free
of the right of dower. Directors v. Royer, 43 Pa. 146 (1862) ; In re Kligerman, 253 Fed.
778 (E. D. Pa. 1918). Contra: In re Lamonica's Real Estate, 141 Atl. 315 (Del. Ch. 1928);
Rickett v. Bolton, 173 Ky. 739, 191 S. W. 471 (1917).
"The tenant in dower is so much favoured, as'that it is the common by-word in the
law, that the law favoureth three things. i. Life. 2. Liberty. 3. Dower." BAcoN, STAT-
IJTE OF Usas *37. See In re Kelleher's Estate, 133 Misc. 58i, 581, 232 N. Y. Supp. 680, 68i
('929) ; Rook v. Horton, 19o S. C. i8o, 184, 129 S. E. 450, 452 (1925).
'B. H. & M. Oil Co. v. Graves, 182 Ark. 659, 32 S. W. (2d) 630 (193o) ; Nemeth v.
Nemeth, io4 N. J. Eq. 6o5, 146 Atl. 470 (1929).
'Smith v. McKelvey, 28 Ohio App. 361, 162 N. E. 722 (1928); thus it is good consid-
eration for a promise, Share v. Trickle, 183 Wis. I, 197 N. W. 329 (1924). For other
property characteristics see Note (igip) ig Col_ L. REV. 492 n. 7.
'In re Macklem, 28 F. (2d) 417 (D. Md. 1928); see Bomar v. Wilkins, 154 S. C. 64,
68, 151 S. E. 110, 112 (193o). But the right of dower is generally held to be divested by
a partition of the husband's land so that the wife does not share in the proceeds. Hag-
gerty v. Wagner, 148 Ind. 625, 48 N. E. 66 (1897) ; Nelan v. Nelan, 30 C. C. 71 (Pa. 1904):
Wilson v. Sailer, 18 D. R. 435 (Pa. 19o9) (curtesy).
'7 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 328 Ill. 136, 159 N. E. 274 (1927); Colvin v. Enver, 97 Fla. 48,
119 So. 148 (1929) (conveyance by husband's trustee in lunacy). But if the wife pre-
deceases the husband the title passed by the husband becomes absolute; see Louisa County
v. Grimm, 203 Iowa 23, 25, 212 N. W. 324, 325 (1927).
'Stone v. Kaufman, 88 W. Va. 588, lO7 S. E. 295 (1921); see Bruno v. Pate, 153
Atl. 311 (R. I. i931).
'Roberts v. Roberts, 131 Ark. go, 198 S. W. 67 (1917); Bauman v. Minamon, 132
Misc. 891, 230 N. Y. Supp. 723 (1928). Even a title gained by adverse possession during
the husband's lifetime is subject to dower, Rook v. Horton, supra note 3; unless, by statute,
a dower interest is allowed only of that land of which the husband died seised. Butcher
v. Butcher, 137 Mich. 390, ioo N. W. 604 (29o4) ; in Pennsylvania, however, where a pur-
chaser from the husband possesses land, her interest during her husband's lifetime, is not
thereby affected. Winters v. DeTurk, 233 Pa. 359, i Atl. 354 (890).
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dower 10 as well as other encumbrances 1 is cut off. But, although others having
an interest in the land, such as mortgagees," lessees,' 3 and vendees '4 are pro-
tected out of the compensatory proceeds, the courts disagree as to whether the wife
is entitled to any portion of the proceeds for the loss of her interest. 15 The courts
which deny relief do so on the ground that it is a hardship on the husband to
deprive him of a portion of the money when he would have had the use of the
entire land with a possibility of getting the absolute fee contingent on his wife
predeceasing him.16 It is submitted that the interests of husband and wife would
best be protected by placing the proceeds, to which the dower right would attach,
in trust with the income payable to the husband until the decease of either spouse,
with remainder over to the surviving spouse1r This gives.the husband the same
benefits he would have gotten from the land and avoids the queer anomaly
created by the decision in the present case where the right which is so carefully
protected when threatened by private interests is totally disregarded where public
interests are concerned, without any valid reason for the distinction.' s
INSURANCE-MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES-BY-LAw REDUCING LIA-
BILITY UNDER EXISTING PoLIcIEs-Plaintiff took out insurance with a mutual
company, by the policy becoming a member "according to the Charter and By-
Laws". Under the power to amend given by the charter, the company's directors
"Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 24 N. E. 161 (I919) ; Arnold v. Buffalo, etc. Ry. Co.,
32 Pa. Super. 452 (i9O3) ; LEwis, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. I909) § 522; Note
(1925) 5 A. L. R. 1347.
'Collector of Taxes v. Revere Building, 177 N. E. 577 (Mass. 1931) ; State v. Hall,
325 Mo. 165, 28 S. W. (2d) 8o (593o); In e- Allen St., 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 377
(931).
City of Birmingham v. Edmond, 134 So. 622 (Ala. i93I); In re Forman, 138 Misc.
502, 24o N. Y. Supp. 718 (I93O).
'Clark v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 337 (1929), Wren v. Smith, 41 F. (2d) 972 (Ct.
of App. D. C. I93O).
" Cullen v. Bender, 122 Ohio St. 82, 17o N. E. 633 (930). It is to be noted that some
interests, are too uncertain of enjoyment to merit compensation for their loss, First Reformed
Church v. Crosswell, 21o App. Div. 294, 206 N. Y. Supp. 132 (1924) (possibility of reverter
upon a determinable fee) ; see Lyford v. City cf Laconia, 75 N. H. 22o, 226, 7z Atl. Io85,
io89 (I9O9) (right of entry for breach of condition subsequent) ; cf. Venable v. Wabash Ry.
Co., 112 Mo. 103, 112, 20 S. W. 493, 49.5 (1892) (dictum to the effect that dower is too
uncertain a right to merit compensation).
"The point seems to have been raised in only four jurisdictions up to the present time.
The wife was allowed to share in the proceeds in Wheeler v. Kirtland, :27 N. J. Eq. 534
(1875); In re N. Y. & Brooklyn Bridge, 75 Hun 558, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1894) (Aff'd
without opinion 143 N. Y. 640, 37 N. E. 823 (5894)). Contra: Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass.
312, 50 N. E. 65o (1898); Long v. Long, supra note lO.
"In addition to the instant case see Long v. Long, supra note Io at 337, 124 N. E. at
163. Flynn v. Flynn seems to have been decided by analogy to partition proceedings of the
husband's lands where the wife is not usually held to be entitled to any part of the pro-
ceeds, supra note 6. For a criticism of this analogy, see Note (i919) 19 CoL L. Ray.
492, 1. 9-
"Parsons v. Luiza, 205 Ala. 20o6, 87 So. 8o (592o) ; Wood v. Price, 79 N. J. Eq. 14,
81 Atl. 664 (I91O). The value of the inchoate right of dower is usually considered capable
of ascertainment according to the rule laid down in Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige 386, at
408 (N. Y. 1839), "The proper rule . . . is to ascertain the present value of annuity for
her [the wife's] life equal to the interest in the third of the proceeds of the estate to which
her contingent right of dower attaches, and then to deduct from the present value of the
annuity for her life, the value of a similar annuity depending on the joint lives of herself
and her husband; and the difference between those two sums will be the present value of
her contingent right of dower." Accord: American Blower Co. v. MacKenzie, 197 N. C.
152, 147 S. E. 829 (1929).
"S There is the further factual distinction that here the land is not being voluntarily
conveyed by the husband. But this difference does not suggest any reason why different
legal conclusions should follow therefrom.
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passed a by-law reducing its liability on risks such as that plaintiff had insured.
Held (two judges dissenting), that the company's liability remained unchanged
since the plaintiff had not expressly agreed to be bound by future by-laws.
Part, idge v. Michigan Mutuad Windstorm Insurance Co., 239 N. W. 309 (Mich.
193').
Where the insured expressly agrees to be bound by future by-laws, it is
generally held a mutual insurance company or beneficial society I can increase his
assessment,2 or otherwise alter his policy.3  Some cases, however, though approv-
ing of by-laws increasing assessments, hold by-laws reducing the company's lia-
bility invalid,4 and still other cases hold that by-laws which would alter the policy
are unreasonable 5 or must be construed as prospective.6 Where, on the other
hand, there is no express assent to future by-laws, as in the instant case, but
merely an assent to a charter which authorizes amendments, it is quite generally
agreed that a retrospective by-law changing the contract of insurance is invalid.
However, this is not the rule where benefits are merely incidental to membership
in the organization." While, logically, assent to a charter includes assent to a
power of amendment contained therein, it is a practical distinction that the insured
should independently agree to subsequent alterations in his contract through
by-laws, in order that he understand that he is not merely agreeing to the charter
and by-laws as they then are. The power to pass by-laws--such as do not, how-
ever, materially alter the insured's contract O-is inherent in a mutual society; 10
'The two are treated as the same, so far as insurance rights are concerned. Supreme
Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436 (1882) ; Northwestern Benevolent Ass'n v. Wanner,
24 Ill. App. 357 (1887).
2Williams v. Supreme Council, 152 Mich. i, II5 N. W. io6o (igos) ; Livingston v.
Cypher, 243 Mich. 500, 220 N. W. 721 (1928) ; Messer v. Grand Lodge, i8o Mass. 321, 62
N. E. 252 (19o2); Fullenwider v. Royal League, ISo Ill. 621, 54 N. E. 485 (899). Contra:
Smythe v. Knights of Pythias, 198 Fed. 967 (N. D. N. Y. 1912) ; Green v. Royal Arcanum,
2o6 N. Y. 591, ioo N. E. 411 (1912), rev'd, (on other grounds), 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct.
724 (1914); (1913) ii MICH. L. REv. 481.
'For example: by subsequent by-law forbidding member engaging in liquor business-
Brown v. Knights of the Modern Maccabees, 167 Mich. 123, 132 N. W. 562 (1911); Grand
Lodge v. Burns, 84 Conn. 356, 8o Atl. 157 (1911). Contra: Lloyd v. Knights of Pythias, 98
Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 7th, i899)-by subsequent by-law declaring forfeiture for suicide-Hughes
v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows, 98 Wis. -292, 73 N. W. 1015 (1898). But cf. Farmers' Mutual
Rail Ass'n v. Slattery, 115 Iowa 410, 88 N. W. 949 (1902) (policy not altered by subsequent
by-law declaring forfeiture for ,failure to pay assessments).
"Reynolds v. Royal Arcanum, 192 Mass. 150, 78 N. E. 129 (I9o6), 7 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1154 (i9o7) ; Legion of Honor v. Getz, ii2 Fed. n19 (C. C. A. 3d, i9oi) ; Weiler v. Equitable
Aid Union, 92 Hun 277, 36 N. Y. Supp. 734 (i895) (reduction of liability considered destruc-
tion of a vested right). But cf. Covenant Mutual Life Ass'n v. Tuttle, 87 Ill. App. 309
(1899) (where although the value of the policy would otherwise decrease, it was held assess-
ments could not be raised).
Weiler v. Equitable Aid Union, supra note 4; Ross v. Modern Brotherhood, 120 Iowa
692, 9.5 N. W. 207 (i9o3) ; Smith v. Knights of Pythias, 83 Mo. App. 512 (190o).
'Wist v. Grand Lodge, 22 Ore. 271, 29 Pac. 6Io (1892) ; Insurance Co. v. Connor, 17 Pa.
136 (i8.5I) ; Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 104 Fed. 638 (C. C. A. 8th, i9oo).
'Beach v. Knights of Maccabees, 177 N. Y. ioo, 69 N. E. 281 (1904) ; Peterson v. Gib-
son, 191 IIl. 365, 61 N. E. 127 (1901) ; 2 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) § III6.
'McDowell v. Ackley, 93 Pa. 277 (i88o) (benefits incidental to membership on Phila-
delphia Stock Exchange) ; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun 49 (N. Y. 1883) (benefits inci-
dental to membership in a fraternal organization) ; Fugure v. Society of St. Joseph, 46 Vt.
362 (874) (same).
'Hawkinson v. United Commercial Travelers, 20 S. W. (2d) ioi (Tex. 1929) ; (I93O)
28 MICH. L. Ray. 625; Becker v. Berlin Society, 144 Pa. 232, 22 Atl. 699 (1891) ; Starling v.
Supreme Council, io8 Mich. 44o, 66 N. W. 340 (1896). Contra: Barbot v. Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n, IOO Ga. 681, 28 S. E. 498 (1897) (mutual company can raise assessments).
" Covenant Mutual Life Ass'n v. Kentner, 188 Ill. 431, 58 N. E. 966 (Igoo) ; Susque-
hanna Insurance Co. v. Perrine, 7 W. & S. 348 (Pa. i844) ; ANGELL & AmrEs, CORPORATIONS
(Iith ed. 1882) § 32.5; I BACON, BENEFIT SOCIETIES (4th ed: 1917) § 104.
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hence a mere mention of that right in the charter should add nothing. 1 Further,
since such a policy takes effect both as a contract of insurance and as a certificate
of membership, 2 mention of the charter in the policy would appear to refer to
this latter aspect.' 3 Some recent cases, however, support free power to change
the contract, favoring the argument of the dissent that the life of a mutual organi-
zation is the power to change in order to maintain solvency. 14 This would be a
strong argument, were it not for the fact that the company, which draws up the
contract,"5 can easily reserve such a right by expressly making the contract subject
to future by-laws, and in this way would warn the insured that he is not getting
an absolute right.'"
JUDICIAL SALE-DIRECTION TO SELL CARRIED OUT BY EXECUTOR JNDER
COURT SuPEavisioN-Whaley devised certain real estate in trust with the direc-
tion that upon the death of the beneficiary the property should be sold. He failed,
however, to give his executor power to sell. A sale was therefore made under
the control and direction of the orphans' court as provided for in § 28 of the
Fiduciaries Act.' Subsequently the plaintiff sought to revive a municipal lien
against the property. Held, that the sale was a judicial sale and divested the lien.
City of New Castle v. Whaleys Heirs, lo2 Pa. Super. 492 (1931).
Theoretically a judicial sale is one in which a court, acting through an agent,
is the vendor.2  The determination of the status of a particular sale is usually
a question of statutory interpretation for the purpose of deciding whether the
court is given such power of control over the actual seller as to establish an agency
relationship. The most useful tests are: (I) whether the sale was ordered by
the court and (2) whether the sale was subject to the confirmation of the court.8
In considering the first test it is found that even though the sale was not ordered
by the court, as in the case of a sale made by an executor under a testamentary
" Farmers' Mutual Hail Ass'n v. Slattery, supra note 3; Peterson v. Gibson, 191 Ill. 365,
61 N. E. 127 (Igo').
'Campbell v. American Benefit Fraternity, ioo Mo. App. 249, 73 S. W. 342 (903);
Sisson v. Supreme Court of Honor, 104 Mo. App. 54, 78 S. W. 297 (1904).
" Thus the Missouri cases held that, even where insured expressly promises to be bound
by future by-laws, this promise applies only to by-laws regulating his duties as a member.
Morton v. Royal League, loo Mo. App. 76, 73 S. W. 259 (1903). Cf. Hale v. Equitable Aid
Union, 168 Pa. 377, 31 Atl. io66 (895).
" Zerbel v. Equitable Union, 199 Wis. 298, 226 N. W. 288 (1929) ; Jenkins v. Talbot, 338
Ill. 441, 17o N. E. 735 (193o) ; Note (930) 25 ILL. L. REV. 18o. Contra: Dotlich v. Sloven
Benefit Society, 179 Minn. 151, 228 N. W. 6o8 (1930).
"The fact that the insurance company draws up the policy is the reason for the Well-
settled rule that the policy should be construed most strongly against the insurer in cases of
reasonable doubt. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hurni Co., 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct. 90 (923);
Stipeich v. Ins. Co., 277 U. S. 311, 48 Sup. Ct. 512 (1927). Agreement to the charter hav-
ing a doubtful meaning, this role is another argument for reaching the decision in the instant
case.
is Cases on this general point are numerous and conflicting, both as to holdings and rea-
soning. See further (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 262 and note to Legion of Honor v. Champe, 127
Fed. 541 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o4), 63 C. C. A. REP. 282.
"All powers, authorities, and directions, relating to real estate, contained in any last
will, and not given to any person . . . shall have been deemed to have been given to the
executors thereof; but no such power . . . shall be exercised except under the control and
direction of the orphans' court. PA. STAT. (West, I92O) § 8535; Act of June 7, 1917, P. L.
447, § 28 (c).
2 See Williamson v. Berry, 49 U. S. 495, 547 (850). Judicial sales are to be distin-
guished from execution sales. FREEMAN, VOID JUDICIAL SALES (4th ed. 1902) 3.
3FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1, 2; RCRER, TREATISE oN THE LAW OF JUDICIAL AND
ExEcuTioN SALES (1873) 3-7.
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power,4 it may nevertheless be a judicial one if subject to confirmation. In such
a situation the seller occupies a dual relationship, being the agent of the court
and the appointee of the testator.' On the other hand, the fact that a sale was
ordei ed does not necessarily indicate that it is a judicial sale.
6 The first test is
therefore in no way conclusive though it may often be useful to clarify the situa-
tion. The essential requisite is that the sale be subject to the confirmation of the
court.7  "Subject to the confirmation of" is used in the sense that the contract is
not binding without the court's sanction." It is to be distinguished from a mere
assent by a court to a sale* already binding. The Pennsylvania cases are excellent
to illustrate the practical application of these principles.
0 A sale of real estate
by an executor for the payment of debts is by statute to be ordered by and
subject to the confirmation of the court 
10 and has been held a judicial sale.
1 '
On the other hand a sale by an executor under a testamentary power is not a
judicial sale.12  In this situation the court has nothing to do with the matter unless
the executor has acted wrongfully.' In the instant case the statute provides
that the executor shall be deemed to have the power subjct to the "control and
direction" of the court. 14  The term "control and direction" "I indicates such a
positive supervision as to amply justify the finding of the so-called agency
Ielation.16
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT WHILE
SPECIALLY EMPLOYED BY ANOTHER-A porter employed by defendant railroad,
while loading mail into a car under the direction of a United States mail clerk,
1
'Warehime v. Graf, 83 Md. 98, 34 At. 364 (1896) (in Maryland all sales by an execu-
tor being under direct supervision of the court are thus judicial sales) ; cf. Campbell v.
Parker, 59 N. J. Eq. 342, 45 Atl. 116 (19oo) (a sale by a receiver empowered to sell by
virtue of his office subject to the control of court was a judicial sale). Contra: Estate of
Backesto, 63 Cal. App. 265, 218 Pac. 597 (1923).
'Cf. Harkins v. Murphy and Bolanz, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 568 (i9o8) (an attorney at law
in this case occupies the dual situation of agent to his client and officer of the court).
'See Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason 414, 42o (U. S. C. C. ist, 1829) ; Barth v. Fidelity and
Columbia Trust Co., 188 Ky. 788, 793, 224 S. W. 351, 355 (1920).
• FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2; Roan, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3-7 and cases cited.
'WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 29.
. As to whether in any state an executors' sale is judicial depends on their statutes. There
are in general three situations: (I) all executors' sales are judicial, Warehime v. Graf, supra
note 4; (:2) certain executors' sales are judicial, as in Pennsylvania; (3) no executors' sales
are judicial, Barth v. Fidelity and Columbia, supra note 6, Estate of Backesto, supra note 4.
'° PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §§ 8474, 8495 (1917).
'Vandever v. Baker, 13 Pa. 121 (185o) ; Dixcy's Ex'rs v. Lansing and Sill, 49 Pa. 143
(1865).
'Fisher v. Kurtz, 28 Pa. 47 (1857).
"Kaier's Estate, 49 C. C. 639 (Pa. 192o). This is so regardless of the fact that the
orphans' court is given "control" over executors' actions. PA. STAT. (West, i92o) § 16365
(1917). The context of the statute indicates that the meaning of the word "control" refers
to jurisdiction of the court to entertain actions against executors for wrongful conduct, etc.
"Supra note I.
' It is clear that the term "control and direction" is not here used in the same sense as
in the statute referred to supr note 12. After providing for the particular situation of de-
,fective powers the legislature certainly did not mean to reiterate the general jurisdiction of
the orphans' court. The ordinary meaning can then be attached to the term.
'The plaintiff's argument was that the power to act is derived from the statute acting
upon the will. This view is backed by some precedent. See Mussleman's Appeal, 65 Pa. 480,
488 (1870). However, it practically nullifies the effect of the provision for control. Pos-
sibly the best explanation of the situation is derived from considering the seller as occupying
a dual relationship as an agent of the court and appointee of the testator.
'The defendant railroad was authorized to carry mail, 39 STAT. 412, 429, 39 U. S. C. A.
§ 541. Under a regulation of the Postmaster General issued by authority of such statute, the
railroad was required to supply men to aid in the loading and unloading of the mail.
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negligently injured the plaintiff. The supreme court of Mississippi 
2 set aside
a finding of the jury for the plaintiff and the plaintiff appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Held, that the railroad was not liable. Denton v. Yazoo
etc. R. Co., 52 Sup. Ct. 141 (1932).
A master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant committed in the
scope of employment.2 One of the difficulties of the application of this formula
is the determination of who is the master of a servant employed generally by A
and loaned to B for the performance of some particular work. The test of whose
business was being done 4 is often of no aid since, as in the present and the vast
majority of cases the work will be for the benefit of both A and B.' A second
suggested test is: which master was bound by law to perform the particular work
in which the employee was engaged at the time of injury?
6  It is submitted,
however, that this test is superficial and entirely inadequate.
7  Under a third
theory, liability is based upon the power to control the actions of the servant; if
a party had the power to prevent the servant from causing the injury, then he is
liable. The question of the right to control must necessarily be one of fact and
for the jury unless but one inference may be drawn from the facts.
8  The court
however, took the unsatisfactory position of ignoring a verdict for the plaintiff
even though conflicting conclusions might have been drawn as to the defendant's
power of control. 9 The fact that the general employer paid the servant's wages
is of little importance; 10 the power of discharge is not conclusive proof of the
general master's power of control; 11 nor is the fact that the servant would, in the
i6o Miss. 850, 13 So. 656 (i93i).
i COOLEY, TORTS (90o6) 252; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1874.
"Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252 (igoq) ; Burgess v.
Standard Oil Co., 262 Fed. 767 (C. C. A. 7th, i92o).
' In the principal case, the porter in loading the car was aiding the United States Govern-
ment in the delivery of mail, but he was also performing one of the services required of the
railroad company in return for the granting of its franchise and a service required o,f the
railroad in order that it be recompensed for the carrying of mail on its trains.
6 Echert v. Merchants Shipbldg. Corp., 28o Pa. 340, 124 Atl. 477 (1924) ; i LABAT , MAS-
TER AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1923) §24; see also Philadelphia & R. Coal and Iron Co. v. Bar-
rie, 179 Fed. 50, 53 (C. C. A. 8th, I9IO).
'This test is unsatisfactory for the reason that liability is based upon extraneous cir-
cumstances-the master's contractual relations with parties not involved in the action-rather
than upon agency principles which are the basis of the master's liability. In many cases, the
special employer upon whom the onus of the liability would be most likely to fall, might be
held responsible despite the fact that the general employer retaining his power of control over
the servant, had been negligent in failing to exercise such power to properly restrain the
servant in his work.
'Grace & Hyde Co. v. Probst, 2o8 IIl. 147, 70 N. E. 12 (i9o4) ; 2 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d
ed. 19) § 1864. See cases cited in Sargent Paint Co. v. Petrovitzky, 71 Ind. App. 353, at
368, 124 N. E. 88I, at 885 (919). "
' In Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, supra note 4, the Supreme Court held that a winch-
man employed by the defendant company and loaned by it to a stevedore who had contracted
to unload a ship for the defendant did not, while operating the winch under the supervision
of the stevedore, become his servant. Similarly it was held in Gyarmati v. Linde Air Prod-
ucts Co., 30.5 Pa. i88, I57 Atl. 485 (I93i), that a servant unloading the truck of the defend-
ant did not become temporarily his servant. The court in the principal case, cited the Ander-
son case with approval but distinguished it apparently on the ground that the lent servant
was operating an instrumentality owned by his general employer. Also the instant court was
strongly influenced by the effect of the Postmaster General's regulation which provided that
the servant was to be under the "direction" of the government mail clerk. It seems that this
provision should not have been regarded as absolutely establishing the fact of control by the
special employer.
"Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547 (1826) ; Minor v. Stevens, 65 Wash. 423, i18 Pac.
313 (911).
" Laugher v. Pointer, supra note io; Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48 (85) ; but see Pioneer
Fireproof Construction Co. v. Hansen, 176 Ill. ioo, Io8, 52 N. E. 17, 19 (1898), where the
court said, "the right to control involves the power to discharge, the relation of master and
servant will not exist unless the power to discharge exists." This rule was followed in
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event of a conflict of orders, obey the directions of the general employer. 1 2  But
in order to transfer liability to the special master, it must be clearly shown that
he had authoritative direction and control and not merely the privilege of making
suggestions as to the details of the work.13 The difficulty of determining who is
the master of a "lent servant" suggests the advisability of a statute permitting
the plaintiff to join the general and special employers as co-defendants, and,
upon the proof of negligent injury to plaintiff, requiring them to assume the
burden of proving as between themselves which of them shall respond in
damages.
14
SALES-CHATTEL MORTGAGES-RETENTION OF POSSESSION-EFFECT OF
RECORDING ON SUBSEQUENT SALE-A dealer in automobiles executed chattel
mortgages on automobiles, stipulating that none of the mortgaged cars were to
be sold without the consent of the mortgagee. The mortgages were recorded and
the cars were left with the dealer, some of them being in the showrooms. The
dealer sold one of the unexposed mortgaged cars, 1 without the mortgagee's consent,
to the plaintiff who had no actual knowledge of the existing encumbrances. The
mortgagee threatened to replevy the cars whereupon the plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion to restrain it from so doing. Held, that the defendant mortgagee was estopped
from asserting its title. Denno v. Standard Acceptance Corp., 178 N. E. 513
(Mass. 1931).
Chattel mortgages are similar to conditional sales and it has often been
necessary to distinguish the two. 2  The instant case involves no such problem
but rather is a question of retention of possession by the seller of goods already
sold. This is so because the mortgagor owned the cars before the mortgage
transaction occurred, and because the effect of the mortgage was to pass title
just the same as if it were a sale.' Therefore as the court notes, the subsequent
Harding v. St. Louis Stockyards, 242 Ili. 444, 9o N. E. 205 (19o9) and in Connolly v. People's
Gas Light Co., 26o Ill. 162, 1O2 N. E. 10.57 (1913) ; see also City of Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa.
247, 254 (1877); I SHEARMAN AND REIDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 1898) 245.
'2 AGENcY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 452 (a).
Principal case at 142.
"Pennsylvania has simplified the plaintiff's task to a great extent under the Joint Suit
Act of June 29, 1923, P. L. 981, PA. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 17316 (a) I, by permitting both
employers to be sued jointly although it does not go so far as to demand that the burden of
exculpating themselves be placed upon the co-defendants. It was said in a recent case under
the statute that if the jury are unable to decide which defendant was liable, then joint lia-
bility rsults. Lang v. Hanlon, 302 Pa. 173, 178, 153 Atl. 143, 145 (1930) ; (1931) 79 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 973. Although the dictum in the Lang case, supra, cannot be justified on prin-
ciples of agency (since it is impossible for a servant to have two masters at the same time),
it is submitted that the burden of establishing who was the master at the time of the injury
should be placed uoon the co-defendants since (I) the negligent party is admittedly the
servant of one or the other and (2) the facts of such control are within the peculiar knowl-
edge of the employers. It is interesting to note that when the Lang case again came before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 157 Atl. 788 (931), the court, after reiterating this dictum,
sustained the lower court in setting aside the verdict of the jury (against the defendants
jointly) as contrary to the evidence and giving judgment against one of the defendants only.
'The court laid no particular emphasis upon this fact, see infra note 6. In a sense, how-
ever, this fact raises the very interesting situation met with in the leading case of Thurber &
Co. v. Anderson, 88 Ill. 167 (1878), where there was a so-called representation to the world
but yet not one on which there was reliance.
'Magill, The Legal Advantages and Disadvantages of the Various Methods of Selling
Goods on Credit (1923) 8 CORN. L. Q. 2io, 215; Note (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 740; (1922)
22 COL L. REv. 183.
22 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 579. In Massachusetts title passes to the mort-
gagee on the execution of the mortgage. See JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (5th ed. 19o8)
§426.
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sale to the plaintiff carme within § 25 of the Uniform Sales Act,4 in spite of the
fact that the transaction was recorded. This constructive notice has often been
held insufficient to permit the original owner to recover, the court preventing him
from asserting his title.5 To invoke the doctrine of estoppel it is necessary that
the owner should have made it appear to the innocent third party that the pos-
sessor is the real owner, upon which the purchaser relied. Mere possession is
not sufficient to constitute the necessary representation.7  Something more is
required, as in the instant case, where the possessor was one who normally, in the
course of his business sells such articles. Yet even though the possessor is a
dealer the evidence must be clear that he appeared to be the owner.8 These deci-
sions 9 sustaining the vendee's title against the real owner seem to nullify the
effect of recording acts, the purpose of which is to give notice of existing encum-
brances and avoid fraudulent conveyances. 10 But it is not practical to demand
the prospective purchaser of a chattel from a dealer to search through voluminous
public records 11 since it will hinder the consummation of business transactions.
Therefore the principal case is not only in accord with the authorities 'I but also
in compliance with good business policy.
SUBROGATION-BANKS AND BANKING-ADVANCE OF FUNDS TO DEPOSITORS
BY BANK SUPERINTENDENT NOT A VOLUNTARY PAYMENT-A state banking
superintendent, having advanced the amount of stockholders' statutory liability
from a depositors' guaranty fund I in order to pay insolvent bank's depositors
in full, sought to be subrogated to their claims against the stockholders.2  Held,
that the superintendent is not a volunteer and is entitled to subrogation. Love v.
Robinon, i37 So. 499 (Miss. 193I).
The right of subrogation is said to be restricted so that a mere volunteer is
not entitled to it, but only one who is legally responsible, or who has been re-
'In effect it states that a purchaser gets a good title, in this situation. This section rests
on the fraud theory rather than the estoppel theory.
'Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 59x (1920). Contra: Har-
den v. State Bank of Seattle, iig Wash. I69, 205 Pac. 382 (1922).
'O'Connor v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318, 32 Atl. io29 (895); BiGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed.
1913) 607. In spite of the fact that the plaintiff, in the principal case did not see the auto-
mobile before he bought it, the court found a sufficient representation and reliance in the
fact that the seller was a dealer and the other mortgaged cars were on exhibition.
"Drain v. La Grange State Bank, 303 Ill. 330, 135 N. E. 780 (1922) ; Cadwallader v.
Shaw, 127 Me. 172, 142 Atl. 58o (1928).8 Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 315 (1882).
'Coffman v. Citizen's Loan & Invst. Co. et al., 172 Ark. 889, 290 S. W. 961 (927);
O'Neil v. Cheatwood, 127 Va. 96, io2 S. E. 596 (1920). UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT
§ 9 provides that where goods are sold conditionally for resale in the ordinary course of busi-
ness a bona fide purchaser gets a good title in spite of recording of the transaction. See
BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES, UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, Vol. 2-A,
§§ 78, 8o; Vold, The Divided Property Interest in Conditional Sales (0930) 78 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 713, 732.
" Hawkins v. Stoffers, 40 Wyo. 226, 276 Pac. 452 (1929) ; Lewis v. State, 32 Ariz. 182,
188, 2.6 Pac. 2048, IO.5O (927).
"t Coffman v. Citizens' Loan & Invst. Co. et al.. supra note 9.
2Boie v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., supra note 5; Coffman v. Citizens' Loan & Invst.
Co. et al., supra note 9; In re Hallbauer, 275 Fed. 126 (S. D. Fla. 92o) ; I Wr.LISTON, op.
cit. supra note 3, P. 721, n. 12. Contra: Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 254, 144 S. E. 835
(1928) ; Harden v. State Bank of Seattle, supra note 5.
'Mrss. ANN. CODE (Harrison, 2930) §3791 provides a fund for the payment of de-
positors of failed guaranteed banks.
2 Miss. ANN. CODE, supra note i, § 38,5 reads: "The stockholders of every bank shall
be individually liable, ... for the benefit of the depositors in said bank to the amount of
their stock . . . in addition to said stock .... 1"
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quested by the debtor to satisfy the claim.3 The severity of the rule has been
relaxed so as to permit a recovery to one under a moral obligation; 4 to one
who makes a payment to protect his own interest; I and, according to some courts
to one who pays under a mistake of law or fact.6 These, and other examples,7
illustrate the vagueness of the term "volunteer", a result, perhaps, inevitable in
the interpretation of an equitable doctrine depending so much on the facts of the
particular case. The meaning of "volunteer" should be restricted to an officious
intermeddler.8  An analogy may be taken from the law of torts where one, who
is injured in the rescue of another who has been imperiled by the negligence of
a third person, may recover against that third party.9 Clearly the rescuer is a
"volunteer" but not an ifitermeddler, and it would obviously be surprising if
recovery were not permitted. Similarly in the instant case the superintendent is
not an intermeddler, for, rather than being under a moral obligation as the
rescuer, he is fulfilling a legal and managerial duty '0 which is preventing hard-
ships by releasing the depositors' funds to them. The need for this may not be so
urgent in this case as in the tort case, yet there is an ultimate necessity to innu-
merable depositors. The court in the instant case is following the modern exten-
sion of the doctrine of subrogation in order to dispense justice to the litigants,
which in this case prevents the inequitable result of unjust enrichment."
TAXATION-RECEIVERs-LIABILITY OF RECEIVER FOR FRANCrsE TAX-
Suit was brought against the receivers of a grocery company to recover the state
franchise tax 1 which had been levied against them for the period during which
they had operated the business of the corporation. Held, that the receivers were
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 8 Sup. Ct. 625 (1888); Wragg v.
Wragg, 208 Iowa 939, 226 N. W. 99 (1929) ; Leggate v. Korn, 74 Pa. Super. 383 (i92o):
SHEnix0o, SuBRoGATIoN (2d ed. 1893) § 240.
'Voltz v. National Bk., 158 Ill. 532, 42 N. E. 69 (189.5) ; Slack v. Kirk, 67 Pa. 380
(I87r).
'Redington v. Cornwell, 9o Cal. 49, 27 Pac. 40 (i8gi) ; Banks v. Cartwright, 26 S. W.
(2d) 7o8 (Tex. 1930).
'Taylor v. Roniger, 147 Mich. 99, 1io N. W. 503 (1907).
7 Curry v. Curry, 87 Ky. 667, 9 S. W. 831 (i88i) (agent paying own money to protect
principal's estate held not a volunteer) ; Yokum v. Yokum, 157 S. E. 579 (W. Va. i931)
(representative advancing own money to pay the estate debt held subrogated to the rights
of the creditors he paid). These cases illustrate the *attitude of the courts when some public
interest, as settling decedents' estates quickly, is involved.
"Hope, Officiousness (930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 25, 205. This article contains an ex-
cellent summary of the distinction between the Roman and English views on this subject.
It also discusses fully the various aspects of the problem.
'Wagner v. International R. R., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1g2i). The principle is
not limited to the rescue of life, but is also applied to the saving of property. Liming v.
Central R. R., 89 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (i8go).
"' Miss. AN. CODE, supra note I, § 3792. The superintendent is to pay dividends as
often as possible and to pay the depositors in full if possible. The superintendent was per-
forming a managerial duty at the same time he was fulfilling his legal duty, and in that
case the courts have permitted recovery. Dakota Trust Co. v. Headland, 57 N. D. 8io, 224
N. W. 22o (1929); Yokum v. Yokum, supra note 7.
'Di Giovanni v. Giliberto, x39 Misc. 616, 62o, 248 N. Y. Supp. 82, 85 (1931) says:
"This doctrine, in recent years, has been extended in its scope to a great variety of situa-
tions in order to work out complete justice among the litigants." Crippen v. Chappel, 35
Kan. 495, I1 Pac. 453 (I886) (subrogation permitted to prevent unjust enrichment).
2MICH. CoiiB. LAws (I929) § 10140. "Every corporation . . . shall . . . for the
privilege of exercising its franchise and of transacting its business within this state, pay
an annual fee . . ." "It is the intent of this section to impose the tax herein pro-
vided for upon every corporation . . . having the privilege of exercising corporate fran-
chises within this state, irrespective of whether any such corporation chooses to actually exer-
cise such privilege during any taxable period."
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not liable for the tax. Michigan Trust Co. v. People, 52 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A.
6th, 1931 ).
A franchise tax is generally construed as an excise levied upon the privileges
created by franchise,2 which is directed at the right to exercise, and not the mere
possession of, these state-conferred privileges.3 When a corporation is in re-
ceivership for the purpose of liquidation, with its business entirely suspended, the
franchise tax is generally not assessable against the receiver, since the franchise
privileges are unavailable to the corporation. 4  But when the business of the cor-
poration is continued by the receiver, most courts have held him liable for the tax
on the ground that he is not only the "arm of the court" but also the agent of the
corporation to employ the corporate property and franchises in the conduct of the
business.' In the principal case the receiver actively carried on the business, but
the court considered that he was exercising no taxable "special privileges" created
by franchise, since the franchise of a mercantile corporation, unlike that of a
public utility, confers no privileges which "do not belong to the citizens generally,
of common right". Although the right to engage in mercantile pursuits is open
to citizens generally, independent of any sovereign grant, the privilege of engag-
ing in any business in corporate form is acquired exclusively by grant.6 It was
this privilege which the franchise tax was primarily intended to assess.7 The
advantages inherent in the privilege are not lost when a receiver takes over the
operation of the business, but are present as long as the business is continued,
whether the continued operation by the receiver is for the purpose of protecting
the shareholders or is for the benefit of creditors pending the final liquidation of
the business.8  It would seem that the decision in the instant case creates an un-
2 People v. Hopkins, 18 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Bright v. Arkansas, 249 Fed.
950 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Armstrong v. Emmerson, 300 Ill. 54, 132 N. E. 768 (1921).
3 People v. Hopkins, supra note 2; People v. Williams, 2oo N. Y. 528, 94 N. E. 1O97
(i91o). In New Jersey, however, the tax is considered an arbitrary imposition on the
corporation which will lie whether or not the corporation is capable of exercising its fran-
chises. In re United States Car Co., 6o N. J. Eq. 514, 43 Atl. 673 (1899).
'Greenfield Say. Bank v. Commonwealth, 211 Mass. 207, 97 N. E. 927 (1912) ; State
v. Bradford Say. Bank & Trust Co., 71 Vt. 234, 44 Atl. 349 (i899) ; 8 Tnom[PsoN, CoR-
PORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 6393. Contra: Conkling v. United States Shipbldg. Co., 148
Fed. 129 (C. C. N. J. igo6) ; State v. Bradley, 2o7 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595 (1922) ; In re
United States Car Co., supra note 3. For an adverse criticism of this view see (1926) 39
HARV. L. REv. 516.
Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 8 F. (2d) 3o4 (E. D.
N. Y. 1925) ; In re Detroit Properties Corp., 254 Mich. 523, 236 N. W. 85o (1931) ; Peo-
ple v. Williams, supra note 3; Guardian Say. & Trust Co. v. Templar Motor Co., 116 Ohio
St. 95, i5.5 N. E. 69I (I927). Contra: United States v. Whitbridge, 231 U. S. 144, 34 Sup.
Ct. 24 (913) (construing federal tax) holding that in operating the business the receiver
acts merely as an officer of the court, not for the corporation.
'Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832 (19o4). In at least
one case the applicability of a franchise tax to mercantile corporations has been denied. Wells
Fargo v. Harrington, 54 Mont. 235, 169 Pac. 463 (1917). The overwhelming majority
recognize the privilege of engaging in business through the agency of a corporation as a
taxable franchise, and uphold the franchise tax against a receiver operating a purely mer-
cantile corporation. Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbldg. Corp., supra note
5; State v. Sessions, 95 Kans. 272, 147 Pac. 789 (1915); In re Detroit Properties Corp.;
Guardian Say. & Trust Co. v. Templar Motor Co., both supra note .-
See Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 3o5, 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 403, 404
(1892).
' The corporation is not dissolved by going into receivership. Chemical Nat. Bank v.
Hartford Deposit Co., i6I U. S. x, 16 Sup. Ct. 439 (1896), consequently the advantages
of corporate organization, such as exemption from personal liability of stockholders and
perpetuity of existence, persist- The receiver of a mercantile corporation conducts the busi-
ness under the corporate franchise, People v. Hopkins, supra note 2; State v. Sessions,
supra note 6; In re Detroit Properties Corp., supra note 5, even where the conducting of
the business is for benefit of creditors and the business is eventually dissolved. People v.
Hopkins, State v. Sessions, supra.
RECENT CASES
warranted exemption from the liability contemplated by the legislators in enacting
the franchise taxY
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--"LAST CLEAR CHANCE"-UJNDER
THE FEDERAL EMIPLOYER'S LIABILITY AcT-Having misinterpreted orders, a
conductor and engineer started their train. The error was pointed out to the
conductor in time to avoid a head-on collision, but due to his hesitation a crash
ensued, killing the engineer. The widow of the latter brought an action against
the railroad under the Federal Employer's Liability Act,' which provides for
mitigation of damages in cases of contributory negligence.2  Held, that plaintiff
could recover in full, since the conductor had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
crash. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. V. Simpson, 43 S. W. (2d) 251 (Ark.
1931).
The instant case presents a set of facts which offer a perplexing problem
under a rule permitting mitigated damages. Considering only the original mis-
conduct of the engineer and conductor aside from any "last clear chance", it
would appear to fall within the rule.- But most cases have denied any recovery
at all in such a situation.4  Beginning with the opinions of justice Holmes, in
two leading cases,5 the reason advanced is that the plaintiff's negligence was the
sole cause. Perhaps the better analysis is not causation 6 but the absence of any
duty owed to the plaintiff. One employee cannot be under a duty to another
to do that for his safety which the other was obligated to do himself. But the
duty does arise where there is later knowledge in addition to an opportunity
to prevent the danger. This is the situation in the present case, and if it con-
stitutes "last clear chance" then a recovery in full is undoubtedly correct.7  But
"last clear chance," accurately speaking, is an answer to a plea of contributory
negligence, whereas the immediate case might be described as a unique set of
circumstances where the plaintiff's previous misconduct has precluded him as the
beneficiary of a duty owed by the defendant, until there is a state of actual knowl-
edge on the part of the latter."
' The effect of the decision is to discriminate against well-managed corporations, since
corporations in the hands of a receiver are exempt from the tax. It may be noted that
there is a not uncommon situation in which such discrimination is particularly unfair,
namely, where a solvent but shaky corporation is operated by a receiver, as was the case
in It re Detroit Properties Corp., supra note 5. For a criticism of the principal case, see
(932) 41 YALE L. J. 47I.
'35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. §§51-59 (1928).
lbid. § 53.
'Cases in which diminished damages were granted under § 53 are collected in 45 U. S.
C. A. 379 et seq.
'Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 263 U. S. I, 44 Sup. Ct. 1 (1923); Unadilla Valley
Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U. S. 139, 49 Sup. Ct. 91 (1928); McDonald v. Great Northern
R. Co., 166 Minn. 87, 2o7 N. W. 194 (1926). Contra: Penna. Co. v. Sheeley, 221 Fed. goi
(C. C. A. 6th, IN1) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hennig, 162 Ky. 171, 171 S. W. 853 (1914).
'Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., supra note 4; Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. 147,
45 Sup. Ct. 33 (1924). The facts in the Frese case can be distinguished on the ground that
there was no rule of the company or statute requiring the employee, whose negligence was
the basis of the action, to watch out for the oncoming train. The Davis case, however, is
exactly in point.
'Most courts explain the "last clear chance" doctrine by calling the defendant's act the
sole and proximate cause. The better and more logical view is that the negligence of
plaintiff and defendant may be substantial causes, but that the "last clear chance" doctrine is
an exception to the defence of contributory negligence. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence
(IgoS) 21 HARV. L. REv. 233, 239; Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause
(1927) 6 N. C. L. REv. 3, 21.
"See Admiralty Commissioner's S. S. Volute, [I922] i A. C. 129.
'Although it is not an analogous case, the same idea is involved in the situation which
permits a trespasser to recover from a landowner only where the latter fails to act with
due care while aware of the former's presence. By some policy of law, the landowner owes
no duty to the trespasser until such time when his presence and peril are discovered.
